Tech News · Cybersecurity
Optimizely supply chain attack — what businesses should do now

“The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn’t always remain trustworthy.”
— Scott Helme, Report URI
What happened
The Optimizely supply chain attack on Monday, November 16, 2026 caused the websites of 178 organizations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax, to serve malware to their own visitors. Attackers slipped malicious JavaScript into customer projects on Optimizely Web Experimentation, a popular A/B testing and personalization platform, so the bad code loaded from Optimizely’s trusted servers rather than from the hacked sites themselves.
Security firm Report URI, which discovered the campaign, says it checked 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected ones. The code was placed in an optional “Project JavaScript” field that runs on every page. Once loaded, it swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s, captured payment card details typed into a site’s own form fields, grabbed cookies and page screenshots, and tried to load known iOS exploit kits (Coruna and DarkSword) on iPhones and iPads. Report URI traced roughly $7,000 in cryptocurrency to the attacker on the first day. Threat intelligence firm Hudson Rock confirmed links to the exploit-kit infrastructure but said successful hacking of devices has not been shown.
Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page early on November 17, saying it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and added protections. It has not said how many customers were affected, and it reportedly told BleepingComputer the flaw was in its account signup process. Researchers also found a smaller, earlier wave delivered through other third-party scripts, including Kissmetrics and StorifyMe, starting November 13.
FuzeForth’s take
This is not a story about one vendor. It’s a reminder that your website is only as safe as every script it loads. None of the affected companies had their own servers broken into. They trusted a tool, the tool was abused, and their visitors paid the price. Most small business sites load a dozen or more outside scripts: analytics, chat widgets, pop-ups, review badges, ad pixels, A/B testing tools. Each one is a door you didn’t build and can’t fully lock.
The detail that should worry owners most: of 256 affected organizations Report URI examined, 68 had no Content Security Policy at all, and only 24 had one strict enough to block the payload. If billion-dollar brands with security teams missed this, a typical small business or nonprofit site is almost certainly more exposed. Online stores that collect card numbers in their own checkout fields are at the highest risk, while sites using hosted payment fields from providers like Stripe were out of this attack’s reach.
What to do this week: list every third-party script on your site and remove anything you no longer use. Move card entry to hosted payment fields if you haven’t already. Add a Content Security Policy, starting in report-only mode so nothing breaks, and limit where your pages can send data. Turn on monitoring that alerts you when a script changes. If you run Optimizely Web, check your Project JavaScript and custom code, review who has access, and rotate credentials. Our website security and maintenance service covers this kind of script audit, and if your site has years of plugin and tag clutter, a website rebuild can be the cleaner fix. Store owners can also see our notes on ecommerce websites.
Key points
- The Optimizely attack served malicious JavaScript through 178 organizations’ websites on November 16, 2026, according to Report URI.
- The malware swapped crypto addresses, captured card details from on-site forms, stole cookies and screenshots, and targeted iPhones and iPads.
- Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed and the injected code removed; it has not disclosed how many customers were hit.
- Only 24 of 256 affected organizations Report URI examined had a security policy that blocked the payload.
- Any site loading third-party scripts faces the same type of risk, not just Optimizely customers.
Frequently asked questions
Was my website affected by the Optimizely supply chain attack?
Only sites running Optimizely Web Experimentation could have been hit by this specific attack, and Optimizely says it has removed the injected code. If you use Optimizely, check your Project JavaScript and custom code for scripts you didn’t write and rotate account credentials.
What should I do if I visited an affected site on November 16?
Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, as Report URI advises. Watch your card statements if you paid on an affected site, and double-check any crypto address you copied that day.
How do I protect my website from a third-party script attack?
Remove scripts you don’t need, use hosted payment fields for card entry, and deploy a Content Security Policy that limits which sources can load code and where data can be sent. Add monitoring that alerts you when any script on your site changes.